Research
Research
Environmental Research Letters (2025).
Abstract: Fully decarbonized markets for consumer goods would result in drastic lifestyle changes for many individuals. However, most research on climate policy attitudes focuses on energy policy, rather than policies that affect consumer goods that people use and enjoy. I conduct a survey experiment that compares views on an energy tax policy to views on a policy that taxes a high-emissions consumer good (red meat & dairy products). The results show that the effect of targeting consumer goods on support for decarbonization depends on an individual’s consumption preferences. Frequent consumers become less supportive of climate policy when it affects a particular consumer good, whereas non-consumers become more supportive. We observe the first outcome even though the cost of the two policies to consumers is equivalent, highlighting the role of subjective and identity attachments to consumer goods in policy attitudes. This shows how climate policy can favor the interests of certain consumers over others, making groups of consumers another relevant distributive cleavage in climate politics.
Journal of European Public Policy (2021). With Christina Schneider.
Drafts available upon request.
Abstract: Climate policy is often characterized as an outcome of interest group conflict between "greens" (environmentalists and clean technology interests that stand to benefit from decarbonization) and "browns" (the fossil fuel industry and related interests that stand to lose out). However, there are also policy issues that produce winners and losers within these coalitions. What drives legislative position-taking on climate issues with significant intra-coalitional interest group conflict? I show that in the face of green interest group conflict, local economic interests can drive legislators to defect from partisan majorities in a roll call vote. I argue that this is because when signals from green and/or brown interest group coalitions are mixed, policymakers have more latitude to take positions against the partisan majority. To study this, I investigate the case of trade policy on solar PV imports from China, an issue which pits the interests of two pro-decarbonization groups against each other: solar manufacturers (who benefit from protection) and solar developers (who rely on cheap Chinese solar for profits). Looking at a unique Congressional vote on the solar tariff issue, I show that representatives from districts representing solar manufacturers were more likely to vote in favor of the tariffs after controlling for partisanship. This has significant implications for our understanding of the polarization of climate policy and the dynamics of interest group politics in climate.
Abstract: Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the prevalence of firms voluntarily promising to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Literature on this topic has used this form of voluntary behavior as a measure of support for climate action, but is this justified? What types of firms choose to engage in private regulation, and when do they do so? I address these questions by looking at the effect of a firm's expected adjustment costs (the cost and likelihood of regulation) on their target-setting behavior. This allows me to assess whether it is the likely losers or benefactors of climate regulation who engage in target-setting, and in turn, speak to what these actions signify in terms of firm preferences over legislation. Looking at publicly traded firms headquartered in the United States, I find that firms who face lower costs from environmental regulation tend to make targets in states that are controlled by Democrats and thus, more likely to have stronger environmental policy. I conclude this provides evidence that when looking at overall trends, emissions reduction targets are strategically intended to complement, rather than substitute for, public regulation.