Research
Research
Drafts available upon request.
Abstract: Climate policy is often characterized as an outcome of interest group conflict between "greens" (environmentalists and clean technology interests that stand to benefit from decarbonization) and "browns" (the fossil fuel industry and related interests that stand to lose out). However, there are also policy issues that produce winners and losers within these coalitions. What drives legislative position-taking on climate issues with significant intra-coalitional interest group conflict? I show that in the face of green interest group conflict, local economic interests can drive legislators to defect from partisan majorities in a roll call vote. I argue that this is because when signals from green and/or brown interest group coalitions are mixed, policymakers have more latitude to take positions against the partisan majority. To study this, I investigate the case of trade policy on solar PV imports from China, an issue which pits the interests of two pro-decarbonization groups against each other: solar manufacturers (who benefit from protection) and solar developers (who rely on cheap Chinese solar for profits). Looking at a unique Congressional vote on the solar tariff issue, I show that representatives from districts representing solar manufacturers were more likely to vote in favor of the tariffs after controlling for partisanship. This has significant implications for our understanding of the polarization of climate policy and the dynamics of interest group politics in climate.
Abstract: Research on climate policy attitudes in the public has focused on the interests of individuals as workers, taxpayers, and citizens. In this project, I consider how the interests of the public as consumers matter for views on climate policy. To assess the relationship between emissions-intensive consumption and policy attitudes, I conducted a survey experiment comparing preferences towards a conventional energy policy versus a policy that targets a "lifestyle good," for which I employed the examples of red meat and gas-powered vehicles. The results show that overall, people prefer a policy that targets a lifestyle good to a policy that taxes electricity. However, consumers of a lifestyle good respond more negatively to the lifestyle good policy than non-consumers do, and consumers of red meat actually preferred the energy cost policy to the policy that targets red meat and dairy products. These findings show how pocketbook effects that accrue via consumption of emissions-intensive goods and preferential attachments to those same goods can affect support for action. This highlights another cleavage in the distributional politics of climate policy between different types of consumers.
Abstract: Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the prevalence of firms voluntarily promising to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Literature on this topic has used this form of voluntary behavior as a measure of support for climate action, but is this justified? What types of firms choose to engage in private regulation, and when do they do so? I address these questions by looking at the effect of a firm's expected adjustment costs (the cost and likelihood of regulation) on their target-setting behavior. This allows me to assess whether it is the likely losers or benefactors of climate regulation who engage in target-setting, and in turn, speak to what these actions signify in terms of firm preferences over legislation. Looking at publicly traded firms headquartered in the United States, I find that firms who face lower costs from environmental regulation tend to make targets in states that are controlled by Democrats and thus, more likely to have stronger environmental policy. I conclude this provides evidence that when looking at overall trends, emissions reduction targets are strategically intended to complement, rather than substitute for, public regulation.
Journal of European Public Policy (2021). With Christina Schneider.